China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present by Li Hua-Yu; Bernstein Thomas P.; Chen Tina Mai

Author:Li, Hua-Yu; Bernstein, Thomas P.; Chen, Tina Mai
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 483810
Publisher: Lexington Books

The Political Dimension of Sino-Soviet Academic Interactions:The Decision to “Lean to One Side,” Self-Reliance and Science Transfer

The Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), followed by the Civil War (1946–1949) had ruined the Chinese economy. The communist leaders recognized that the reconstruction of China’s economy could not succeed without foreign aid. Giving foreign aid the first priority was “absolutely necessary” under those “objective conditions,” Mao explained in 1962.23 The Communist leaders perceived the neighboring Soviet Union as the only major country from which they could hope to get the badly needed assistance.24 The majority of research literature on this subject confirms this view: The Soviet Union was the only source that could and was willing to provide China with the assistance needed.25

The “lean to one”—that is, the Soviet—“side” policy (yibiandao) was first enunciated in Mao’s article “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” published on July 1st, 1949, in Renmin ribao (People’s Daily). However, already in the fall of 1947 Chinese leaders had started to look for a better and a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. The relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union (and Comintern) had been complicated since the 1920s.26 Not only Mao, but also other Chinese leaders disagreed with Comintern directives and were dissatisfied with the China policy of the Soviet Union. The failures of Stalin’s and the Comintern’s policies were formulated by Mao in his talk with Soviet ambassador Yudin in 1956: Stalin had overvalued the revolutionary potential of the Guomindang (GMD) and forced the Chinese communists into a united front, which resulted in enormous losses on the Communist side. After the end of World War II, Stalin was still not convinced that the CCP could win a domestic civil war and insisted on the signing of a peace agreement with the GMD and consequently the establishment of a “democratic republic.” Even in 1947, when Communist forces were already winning in China, he continued to do so.27 The Soviet Union was as unhappy about Mao’s repeated rejection of Stalin’s requests to tie up the Japanese forces during the war and the Rectification Campaign as Mao was about Stalin’s policy.28

Against this background, the alliance with the Soviet Union does not appear all too natural. Scholars provide different reasons for Mao’s decision to lean on the Soviet side: ideological reasons such as communist internationalism, according to which Chinese Communists saw themselves as a part of World Communism and in direct opposition to the imperialist countries; and strategic reasons such as the perceived threat posed by the United States and the American pro-GMD-policy along with the view that the Soviet Union was the only possible source of needed assistance.29 Probably both ideological and pragmatic reasons played a decisive role. In the following section I will try to elaborate on the relations between the “lean to one side” policy and the concept of self-reliance as well as the relevance of science and technology for these policies.

According to Liu Shaoqi the proclamation of the “lean to one side” policy was the first public statement on

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